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Nurses’ views of using computerized decision support software in NHS Direct
Background. Nurses working in NHS Direct, the 24-hour telephone advice line in
England, use computerized decision support software to recommend to callers the
most appropriate service to contact, or to advise on self-care.
Aims. To explore nurses’ views of their roles and the computerized decision support
software in NHS Direct.
Methods. Qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with 24 NHS Direct
nurses in 12 sites.
Findings. Nurses described both the software and themselves as essential to the
clinical decision-making process. The software acted as safety net, provider of
consistency, and provider of script, and was relied upon more when nurses did not
have clinical knowledge relevant to the call. The nurse handled problems not
covered by the software, probed patients for the appropriate information to enter
into the software, and interpreted software recommendations in the light of con-
textual information which the software was unable to use. Nurses described a dual
process of decision-making, with the nurse as active decision maker looking for
consensus with the software recommendation and ready to override recommenda-
tions made by the software if necessary. However, nurses’ accounts of the software
as a guide, prompt or support did not fully acknowledge the power of the software,
which they are required to use, and the recommendation of which they are required
to follow under some management policies. Over time, the influence of nurse and
software merges as nurses internalize the software script as their own knowledge,
and navigate the software to produce recommendations that they feel are most
appropriate.
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Conclusions. The nurse and the software have distinct roles in NHS Direct, al-
though the effect of each on the clinical decision-making process may be difficult to
determine in practice.
Keywords: NHS Direct, nurse, computerized decision support software
Background
NHS Direct is a 24-hour telephone advice line staffed by
nurses that covers England and Wales, and a similar service
called NHS24, covers parts of Scotland. Nurse advisors use
computerized decision support software to offer triage
recommendations and self-care advice to the general public
over the telephone, on a wide range of health problems. Triage
recommendations are typically to self-care, contact a general
practitioner immediately or later, or attend an accident and
emergency department urgently or as an emergency using a
999 ambulance. Callers have reportedly found the telephone
advice helpful and reassuring (O’Cathain et al. 2000) and
there is evidence that it has halted the upward trend in use of
out-of-hours general practice services (Munro et al. 2000).
Telephone triage services are available in many countries,
including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States of
America (USA) and Denmark. Calls can be taken by
doctors, for example general practitioners triage patients
in their out-of-hours services in Denmark (Christensen &
Olesen 1998), but telephone triage is more commonly
carried out by nurses. Some examples are an ophthalmic
accident and emergency service in the United Kingdom (UK)
(Marsden 2000), an after-hours paediatric service in the
USA (Poole et al. 1993), and a province-wide helpline in
Canada (Robb 1996). NHS Direct is innovative because it
has been established on a national basis, is available
24 hours a day, and deals with all health problems across
all age groups. Similar services are under development in
Australia (Turner et al. 2002) and New Zealand
(St George & Cullen 2001).
Evidence is accumulating about the types of nurses working
in NHS Direct (Morrell et al. 2002), their perceptions of their
new role (Knowles et al. 2002), how they manage the absence
of visual cues during the telephone consultation (Pettinari &
Jessopp 2001), and the effects of training (Payne et al. 2002).
However, little is known about the respective roles of the
nurse and decision support software during the triage process.
At one extreme, the software might drive the decision-making
process with the nurse acting as little more than a computer
operator. This may prompt the question of whether it is
necessary to employ nurses at all, as non-clinical personnel use
software to prioritize calls and offer first aid advice for
emergency ambulance services (Clawson & Dernocoeur
1988). At the other extreme, the nurse might act as an
autonomous decision-maker, with limited reference to the
software, thus questioning the need for such software.
Research on the ways in which nurses use standardized
protocols in telephone triage suggests that they do not
necessarily standardize care (Wachter et al. 1999) and that
nurses vary in the extent to which they use standardized
protocols (Mayo et al. 2002). It has been suggested that
deviation from protocols may be desirable rather than a
shortcoming, and that further research is needed on experi-
enced telephone triage nurses using protocols (Rutenberg
2000). In addition, concerns have been expressed that the
term ‘telephone triage’ does not adequately communicate the
nurse’s role of caregiver and decision-maker, and that there is
potential for this care-giving role to be rendered invisible by
the use of protocols (Wilson & Hubert 2002). There is
expected growth in the use of computerized decision support
systems by nurses in NHS Direct and walk-in centres in the
UK (Salisbury et al. 2002), and in accident and emergency
departments in the UK (Department of Health 2001). Hence,
it was timely to explore nurses’ views of the clinical decision-
making process in NHS Direct so as to understand the
respective roles of nurse and software.
The study
Setting
There were 17 NHS Direct sites established throughout
England during 2000 that employed approximately 1000
nurses. Each site used one of three computerized decision
support software systems. One used algorithms, each with a
set of predetermined questions, to assess callers’ symptoms,
and provide a triage recommendation for the nurse. The
second used guidelines based on a decision tree principle and
provided a triage recommendation for the nurse. The third
used guidelines that prompted questions and drew attention
to critical symptoms, but did not impose a fixed triage
recommendation on the nurse. During 2001 these systems
were replaced by a fourth decision support software system
called the NHS Clinical Assessment System. This was
implemented as the national standard system across all sites
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in England and provided triage recommendations for the
nurse. In the scenario of a caller presenting with a high
temperature, the nurse might enter a relevant algorithm or
guideline of ‘fever’, ask the caller a series of set questions,
enter the callers’ answers and then consider the software
recommendation.
Participants
The study was conducted during 2000. We selected 12 NHS
Direct sites, four using each of the three software systems,
and asked managers from each site to give consent forms and
information sheets to four nurses, two with a background of
working mainly in the community and two with a hospital-
based background. We chose one community nurse and one
hospital nurse to interview in each site. In two sites, we
visited and directly asked nurses to complete consent forms.
Forty-eight nurses were approached, 43 agreed to partici-
pate and 24 nurses were interviewed as planned. Nurses had
a mixture of clinical backgrounds, and between 4 and
30 years clinical experience, with two-thirds of nurses having
10 or more years of experience. The mean length of time
worked in NHS Direct was 13 months, ranging between 4
and 24 months.
Data collection
Two interviewers (AOC and FS) each undertook interviews
with four nurses using each system. We designed a semi-
structured interview schedule to establish nurses’ views of the
software they used, influences on the clinical decision-making
process, and how they used the software in reaching decisions
about the recommendation to give to callers. Interviews took
place at NHS Direct sites in private. They took an average of
40 minutes, ranging from 30 to 50 minutes. The interviews
were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Ethical considerations
Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee approval was
gained for the study. Information was given to participants
and consent obtained as described above.
Data analysis
We undertook framework analysis (Richie & Spencer 1994),
using Winmax software (Kuckartz 1998). AOC and FS read a
sample of the transcripts and identified a preliminary list of
themes, some of which were determined by the study
objectives and some of which emerged from the data. We
both coded a further sample of transcripts according to the
thematic scheme to refine the coding prior to applying the
scheme to all the transcripts. The content of each theme was
considered, that is the sub-themes, and the relationships
between themes. AOC charted themes relevant to the roles of
the nurse and software for half the nurses. KJT and JFM
challenged and discussed the content of, and relationship
between, these themes. AOC returned to the uncharted
transcripts to validate the findings.
Findings
The essential software
The nurses welcomed the presence of the software as essential
to the clinical decision-making process. Even a nurse who
expressed highly negative views about the lack of ‘user
friendliness’ of their software did not want to work without
it. In fact, only one nurse, who had extensive experience in
triage without computerized decision support software, felt
‘quite confident assessing without it’. Nurses described the role
of the software as that of a safety net, provider of consistency,
and provider of script. They felt that the software ensured that
they gave safe advice by considering all potential health
problems and recommending the safest, most appropriate
outcome, but also offered safety for the nurse by providing
justification for, and documentation of, the advice offered.
I think it’s imperative that we have software. (N19)
It’s a safety net for the patient and a safety net for me. You know I
don’t want anything to go wrong, obviously I don’t want the patient
to suffer as a result. (N9)
Nurses were aware that they had different clinical back-
grounds and felt that the software helped to provide consis-
tency of advice between different nurses. Because of the wide
variety of health problems they dealt with, nurses felt that they
did not know how to deal with all health problems and relied
on the software where their experience or knowledge was
limited. The software structured their discussion with patients
by prompting them with questions, offering them a script to
elicit the relevant information from the patient.
I think there needs to be some sort of software to be able to give safe
advice and consistent advice. Because we’ve all come from different
areas, and we’ve all learned different things, some of it’s not evidence
based if you leave it up to the individual. (N5)
But I think that we all have areas that we are not 100% on. And I
think then you go with what the system says. (N14)
The software gives you the relevant questions to ask. (N2)
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The essential nurse
The nurses believed that, although necessary, the software
was by no means sufficient. Some health problems were not
covered by the software, or could not be located by the nurse
during their consultation with the caller, leaving the nurse as
autonomous decision-maker. Further, they felt that the
software was sometimes unable to consider contextual or
other relevant information such as chronicity of health
problem and past medical history. In these circumstances
the nurse interpreted the software recommendation in the
light of information the software could not process.
It works for me to a point. There are times when I have to use no
guideline. (N6)
Patients are all individuals and they will say something that doesn’t fit
in with the software […] it’s only, it’s a standard, it’s a set of
standards, it doesn’t take into account individuals. (N12)
You cannot put people, people do not fit into little boxes, and everyone
presents with questions but they are all different, and I think it would be
hard if I had to say to someone ‘oh well, you know, you need to go to
casualty because the computer told me I have to send you’. (N17)
Nurses commented on the difficulty of making decisions
without face-to-face contact with the patient. The lack of
visual cues meant that they had to rely on asking questions, and
their listening skills, to visualize the patient and their problem
(Pettinari & Jessopp 2001). Nurses were aware that the
information patients gave them could be unreliable or partial
and that what they heard, as well as what they were told,
contributed to their mental picture. Further, they felt that they
had to ask the right questions and probe the patient to ‘find the
truth’ because different callers could give very different
impressions of symptom severity, with some patients appear-
ing to exaggerate symptoms and others to underplay them.
You don’t have the advantage of seeing the patient, you don’t have
the advantage of taking their temperature, doing their blood pressure
this kind of thing. So you’re not only listening to the words they are
saying, but the connotation of what they are saying, how they are
saying it […]. And you are building up a mental visual picture of this
patient all the time speaking to them on the phone. (N18)
Like I was saying about the chest pain could be indigestion, it’s going to
flash up saying chest pain. When you start really digging into it they say
‘oh yes well I’ve just eaten a banana and I’ve been lying down’. (N10)
Dual triage
Nurses viewed the software as a tool, prompt or support, and
felt that the nurse made the clinical decisions. They described
a dual process of decision-making, in which they actively
assessed the patient’s problem independently of the software,
as well as through prompting from the software. Four nurses
used the vivid metaphors of ‘monkey’ and ‘robot’ to describe
anyone who used the software without applying what they
termed ‘critical thinking’.
The nurse’s own knowledge and experience complements really. The
software we use as a guide if you like, we try and build on that with
our own experience. (N21)
I think also the nurse needs to remember that the software is there as
an assessment tool. The responsibility and the accountability for the
outcome of that call and the end point delivered is always there. So
they really need to make sure that the critical thinking, the clinical
ability, communication skills are acute on every single call. Because
otherwise you’d just sit trained monkeys in front of the computer
terminal wouldn’t you. (N18)
The nurses felt that the level of agreement between nurse and
software during this ‘dual triage process’ was generally high,
and when there was disagreement nurses could intervene to
override the software recommendation by ‘upgrading’ to a
higher triage level or ‘downgrading’ to a lower level. This
ability to override contributed to their view that they were
making the decisions, with the software in a supporting role.
This description of the ‘active nurse’ seemed to be an ideal to
which nurses aspired, but which did not always occur. One
nurse felt that she took a less active role in the decision-
making process during busy periods, especially when there
was an outbreak of influenza, because of the monotony of
repeatedly taking similar types of calls.
But the good thing about it is that you can use your nursing knowledge
and judgement to actually change the endpoint as necessary. (N9)
[…] such as over the Christmas period […] the amount of calls is just
phenomenal, absolutely phenomenal [...]. And often they are very
similar, and I think sometimes you know you may lose that, you may
lose your actual concentration and that could show in your results, I
mean that’s only an opinion. But you end up ‘I better have a rest
because I’m just not, I’m not thinking while I’m doing it and I’m just
going through the motions’. [...] it’s like doing constant bed baths. All
the time, something like that, you know never stopping all day. A
nurse doing an injection, after injection, or whatever and never
changing. (N8)
The power of the software
The nurses acknowledged the usefulness of the software, and
indeed its essential role, but their description of it as a ‘tool’ or
‘prompt’ understated the powerful influence of the software in
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the decision-making process. Nurses were required to use the
software whenever possible, whether they welcomed this or
not. When first using the software, nurses described it as
interfering with their consultation with the patient, leading
either to dependence on, or avoidance of, the software.
I use it, I have to go through it, because you know if you don’t go
through [the algorithms] we get our knuckles rapped. (N23)
In the early stages if somebody used to phone up and say they were
short of breath or they’d got chest pain [...]. I wouldn’t get as far as
triaging them [...] it’s a matter of trusting the software. (N11)
We all use it [the software] as a bible for the first six months. I really
did. (N16)
This sense of interference disappeared over time as nurses
gained experience in using the software or learned to trust it,
but it remained for calls in which nurses had relevant clinical
expertise and felt that the software limited their ability to use
their own knowledge.
I think that because it’s actually quite prescriptive and quite directive,
that it, it limits your scope for professional knowledge and your
ability to use your clinical judgement. (N5)
A further sign of the authority of the software was the
limitation on the nurse’s role imposed by management
policies in some sites, which either prohibited nurses from
downgrading software recommendations or encouraged
individual nurses not to stray too far from the standard
pattern of recommendations within the site.
The company won’t allow us to downgrade [the software recom-
mendation]. (N7)
Achieving consensus
When asked about the ideal relationship between software
and nurse, a common response was that they should ‘agree’,
‘match’, or ‘reach a consensus’. This language supported the
idea of a dual process of decision-making by nurse and
software, and the desire for consensus seemed to emphasise
that the software was seen as more than simply a ‘tool’.
Interviewer: What do you think is the ideal relationship between the
software and the nurse?
Nurse: Obviously when they match. (N12)
…usually it comes to the same decision as I was planning. (N16)
Consensus could be achieved in ways that were not neces-
sarily visible to the nurse or to those managing the service. As
the nurses acquired the knowledge and script of the software,
they seemed to internalize it as their own knowledge, feeling
in control of the decision-making process when in reality they
may have been repeating a learnt script from commonly used
guidelines and algorithms. Further, as their knowledge of
commonly used guidelines increased, they became able to
select the guideline they entered and the routes they took
through the software system to ensure that the eventual
software recommendation would match their own. In this
way, nurses attempted to manage clinical risks for the patient
while also minimizing their personal risk by giving advice
consistent with the software recommendation. This progres-
sive integration of nurse and software rendered the influence
of the software invisible to the nurse, and the influence of the
nurse invisible in the software record.
[The software] is there really to reinforce what you are going to say
[...]. Once you’ve used the system a few times, you know what
questions it’s going to bring up, so you can already have asked it
before it comes to that stage. (N7)
There are certain things I would never ever do no matter what the
algo[rithm] indicated. And it wouldn’t indicate that in my case [...]. I
know how the chest pain algo[rithm] goes [...]. I know that’s going to
give a high end point straight away. (N15)
Interviewer: When a decision is reached about the disposition to
recommend to the caller, can you tell me what contributes to that
decision?
Nurse: Almost certainly the guideline. No doubt about that. It’s too
hard to offer an accountable decision without using the guideline or
somehow making the guideline work for you. (N3)
Discussion
The influence of the nurse and the decision support software
merge to the degree that it is difficult to determine the effect of
each on recommendations given to NHS Direct callers. Nurses
feel that both the software and the nurse are essential to clinical
decision-making, and describe a process of ‘dual decision-
making’, with the nurse as active decision maker looking for
consensus with the software recommendation. Nurses influ-
ence clinical advice explicitly by dealing with calls which the
software cannot handle or overriding the software recommen-
dation, and implicitly via the information they glean from the
caller and the way in which they choose to navigate the
software. Their description of the software as a tool, prompt or
support does not fully acknowledge the powerful influence of
the software, which they are required to use, and the recom-
mendation of which they are required to follow under some
management policies. Over time, merging of influence takes
A. O’Cathain et al.
284  2004 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 45(3), 280–286
place as nurses internalize the software script as their own
knowledge, and navigate the software to produce recommen-
dations that they perceive to be most appropriate.
These findings are consistent with those reported in the
wider context of computer–human interaction, for example
aircraft pilots and air traffic controllers who work under
similar temporal constraints and risks as NHS Direct nurses
(Hoc 2000). Such studies have highlighted ‘integrative’
cooperation between computer and human, where agents
have distinct but complementary types of expertise, and
where there is the possibility of some redundancy of human
skills. They have also noted the importance of mutual
control, where the user reasons in parallel with the system
and a search for consensus is undertaken when there is
disagreement, an approach which may help to avoid com-
placency on the part of the human. In the context of
telephone nurse triage, studies have shown that computerized
protocols are not necessarily comprehensive (Brillman et al.
1996), that nurses take the roles of picture-builder (Edwards
1998, Pettinari & Jessopp 2001) and inquirer (Edwards
1994), and that different nurses choose different protocols
and can arrive at different endpoints using the same protocols
(Watcher et al. 1999).
It was surprising that we did not find more discomfort or
dissatisfaction with the software. Previously, doctors have
argued that the use of protocols to aid evidence-based
practice result in loss of clinical autonomy (Tanenbaum
1994), and that there is potential for an inappropriate shift in
authority from the patient or the clinician to the guideline
(Rogers 2002). This may be due to the software being an
integral part of working in NHS Direct, or a ‘survivor effect’
if nurses who are unhappy working with software leave the
service, or that nurses can gain autonomy from the use of
protocols (Manias & Street 2000).
Study limitations
We included a variety of nurses in the study, ensuring they
had a range of length and types of experience outside NHS
Direct, and a range of length of experience of telephone triage
within NHS Direct. We felt that the sample included typical
NHS Direct nurses but may have been biased towards those
considered by their managers to be ‘good nurses’. However,
positive views of the software, and a belief that they
participate in the clinical decision-making process, were also
widespread in a survey of all NHS Direct nurses (Morrell
et al. 2002). Additionally, we relied on the nurses’ accounts
of their role, in which they may have presented themselves as
‘good NHS Direct nurses’. We did not encounter the minority
of NHS Direct nurses who claim to be bored with their work
(Knowles et al. 2002), nor those who have left NHS Direct,
so our findings are not necessarily transferable to all NHS
Direct nurses.
Finally, we have explored nurses’ views of software in a
service where they cannot see the patient. These findings may
not be transferable to services where nurses have face-to-face
contact with patients, such as those in walk-in centres or
accident and emergency departments.
Conclusion
The evidence presented here suggests that recommendations
in NHS Direct result from a process of decision-making in
which both nurse and software play a distinct role. When
dealing with some calls the contribution of the nurse may far
outweigh that of the software, and in others the reverse may
be the case. The process of ‘dual triage’ which occurs, and the
attempt by nurses to find a consensus between themselves and
the software, may be a positive feature of the system which
enables better decision-making than might occur otherwise,
although this remains to be shown empirically. A progressive
What is already known about this topic
• There is increasing use of computerized decision sup-
port software in the NHS, for example in NHS Direct
and walk-in centres.
• Little is known about how health professionals view the
contribution of such software to the clinical decision-
making process.
What this paper adds
• NHS Direct nurses felt that both the software and the
nurse are essential to the decision-making process,
describing a process of dual decision-making, with the
nurse as active decision-maker and the software as a
tool, prompt or support.
• Nurses are required to use the software and, although
they can override the software recommendations, they
are required to follow these recommendations under
certain management policies.
• Over time the influence of nurse and software merge as
nurses internalize the software script as their own
knowledge, and navigate the software to produce rec-
ommendations that they feel are most appropriate. This
can make it difficult to determine the effect of each on
recommendations given to callers to NHS Direct.
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merging of nurse and software influences seems inevitable
and probably desirable. However, there is probably more to
be learnt from studying any points of friction in the system
than from accepting apparent consensus between nurse and
software.
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